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Introduction
Throughout early American history, the primary methods of
communication between politicians and the public occurred in person.
Politicians would make stump speeches on the campaign trail, where they
literally just stood on a tree stump to speak to a crowd of people. Similarly,
politicians interacted with their constituents at town hall style meetings in
government buildings, school auditoriums, or even outside in the town
square.
Today, the rise of the internet and social media has allowed for
instantaneous communication between politicians and members of the
public. This obviously has many benefits, as the internet has arguably
become the most effective means of disseminating ideas and promoting
discourse in human history. However, there have very clearly been
consequences to go along with the rise of social media as a means of
political communication.
One of the more polarizing political issues of 2021 was when social media
platforms like Twitter permanently banned President Donald Trump from
their platforms. Many Republicans cried that this was an unprecedented act
of censorship, while many Democrats argued that this was simply private
corporations exercising their rightful discretion to ban a user who did not
comply with their standards. This article is not concerned with partisan
arguments regarding this conduct; rather, it will explore the First
Amendment principles surrounding the speech and the platform.
To get right to the question, does Twitter’s permanent ban of Donald
Trump violate the First Amendment?1 Currently, the answer is almost
certainly no. As the law stands, most experts are in agreement that the First
Amendment does not restrict online social media platforms from exercising
broad discretion to censor content or individuals that do not comply with
* J.D. Candidate, 2022, Saint Louis University School of Law
1 For the sake of simplicity, this article will focus on Twitter.
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their terms of service.2 In fact, social media platforms seem to have the
ability to censor, suspend, or ban people without even explaining why.3
Overall, the government has taken a relatively hands-off approach to social
media platforms’ supervision of speech on their platforms. However, as
social media becomes an increasingly large part of modern society, the
power to control discourse on these platforms becomes increasingly
important. Therefore, even if social media platforms have a right to
unilaterally ban users from their platforms, should they? More importantly,
should we let them?
Figuring out exactly how the Supreme Court or Congress might someday
apply free speech principles to private online platforms is far outside the
scope of this brief article. Instead, this article will explore three free speech
principles: (1) the First Amendment broadly protects political speech, (2)
prior restraints on speech are viewed unfavorably, and (3) the First
Amendment can prevent private entities from restricting speech in limited
circumstances.4 Based on these premises, this article seeks to demonstrate
that, although permanent bans of political actors by social media platforms
do not currently violate any law, they likely do violate some of the values
underlying the freedom of speech in America.
Analysis
1. The First Amendment Places a High Value on Political Speech
The First Amendment, in relevant part, provides that “Congress shall make
no law … abridging the freedom of speech.”5 This text, on its own, provides
surprisingly little information; there is so much more to free speech
jurisprudence than this clause would indicate. For example, this clause does
See Adam Liptak, Can Twitter Legally Bar Trump? The First Amendment Says Yes, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 9, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/09/us/first-amendment-freespeech.html.
3 See e.g., Lon Baker After 11 Years on Twitter, I was Permanently Suspended Without a Good
Reason, BETTER MARKETING (Jul. 24, 2021), https://bettermarketing.pub/dear-jack-twitteris-broken-f2eecadd59ee; see also Ellissa Bain, Why Is My Snapchat Permanently Locked?
#Unlockoursnaps Trends On Twitter As Users Report Error!, HITC,
(https://www.hitc.com/en-gb/2020/11/17/why-is-my-snapchat-permanently-locked/.
4 See infra notes 8–10, 15–18, and 23–28.
5 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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not explain that speech can be separated into different categories, which are
afforded different levels of protection. Some categories, like obscenity,
fighting words, and defamation, can be entirely outside the protection of
the First Amendment.6 Then, there are other categories of speech, such as
commercial speech, which are protected by the First Amendment, but can
still be limited by government interests.7 Finally, the most highly protected
category of free speech is political speech, or more broadly, speech on
matters of public concern. Federal courts have expressed that “political
expressions are crucial to self-government and are afforded broad
protection in order to … ‘assure [the] unfettered interchange of ideas for the
bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people.’” 8
Similarly, the Supreme Court has held that “speech on public issues
occupies the highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values, and
is entitled to special protection.”9 Thus, the caselaw makes it clear that the
First Amendment places a high value on speech related to matters of public
concern.
Moreover, the bar for qualifying as protected political speech is fairly low.
For example, consider Westboro Baptist Church protests outside of military
funerals. It may be an understatement to call this speech outrageous and
offensive. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has held that as long as this
speech is broadly on a matter of public concern, it deserves protection of
the First Amendment, and any government-imposed limitation on it must
survive strict scrutiny.10
Turning to the case of Donald Trump’s permanent suspension, the content
of Trump’s speech on Twitter (generally, as well as the tweets that actually
got him suspended) most likely would be considered protected political
speech in other contexts. Twitter suspended Donald Trump’s account after
two particular tweets. The first tweet read, “The 75,000,000 great American
Patriots who voted for me, AMERICA FIRST, and MAKE AMERICA

R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377, 382–84 (1992).
Bd. of Trustees of State Univ. of New York v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989).
8 Republican Party of Pennsylvania v. Cortes, 218 F. Supp. 3d 396, 415 (E.D. Pa. 2016)
(quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)).
9 Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 452 (2011) (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145
(1983)).
10 Id. at 1216.
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GREAT AGAIN, will have a GIANT VOICE long into the future. They will
not be disrespected or treated unfairly in any way, shape or form!!!” 11 The
second tweet read, “To all of those who have asked, I will not be going to
the Inauguration on January 20th.”12
These tweets, and practically every statement made by a sitting President,
likely constitute speech on matters of public concern, and therefore, are
entitled to broad First Amendment protection. A potential argument
against this is that Trump’s speech may constitute fighting words. Fighting
words are words, which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to
incite an immediate breach of the peace.13 Indeed, it was the fear of further
violence that led to Twitter suspending Trump.14 However, looking at the
content of the words above, the fighting words doctrine is likely too narrow
to encompass Trump’s tweets. Even Trump’s critics likely would not think
that the above words, by their very nature, incite violence. Perhaps a
stronger argument is that Trump’s tweets, given the context, constituted
incitement of lawless action. Under this doctrine, speech is outside the
protection of the First Amendment when it is directed to inciting or
producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such
action.15 In the case of Donald Trump’s tweets in early January of 2021, it
likely would be difficult to prove in court that Donald Trump actually
intended for his supports to engage in lawless action, and may be equally
difficult to prove causation. Nevertheless, as Donald Trump promulgated
a theme of the election being stolen from him, while stating things like “If
you don't fight like hell you're not going to have a country anymore,” there
is a possibility that a court would find that some of his tweets represented
an imminent incitement of lawless action.16 However, even if some of
Donald Trump’s tweets are not protected speech, the next section will
demonstrate that a total ban from the platform, rather than simply
removing unprotected speech, is not consistent with the values of free
speech.
Twitter, Inc., Permanent suspension of @realDonaldTrump, TWITTER (Jan. 8, 2021),
https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/company/2020/suspension.html.
12 Id.
13 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
14 See supra note 11.
15 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
16 Capitol riots: Did Trump's words at rally incite violence?, BBC (Feb. 12, 2021),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-55640437.
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Thus, the vast majority of Donald Trump’s tweets, however controversial
they may be, constitute political speech, or at least speech on matters of
public concern, for the purposes of the First Amendment. Again, this does
not mean that private entities like Twitter cannot legally restrict this speech.
Rather, it means that the principles underlying freedom of speech suggest
that political speech has value, and contributes to the public discourse in a
free society. Therefore, although Twitter currently has this power,
censoring political speech is not something that it should do lightly.
2. The Law Disfavors Prior Restraints
Another problem with permanent Twitter suspensions has to do with the
law’s disfavor towards prior restraints. A prior restraint occurs when an
individual or entity is denied access to a forum for expression before the
expression occurs.17 Prior restraints on speech have been called “the most
serious and least tolerable infringement on First Amendment rights.”18
Underlying this deep disdain for prior restraint is the idea that “a free
society prefers to punish the few who abuse rights of speech after they
break the law than to throttle them and all others beforehand.”19 Free speech
advocates fear that prior restraints can be imposed based on predictions of
danger that would not actually materialize and thus would not be the basis
for subsequent punishments.20
This doctrine is often applied to the freedom of the press, where courts have
generally rejected government attempts to prevent publication of
unprotected content.21 However, the underlying rationales might be useful
in understanding why permanent bans on speech are not consistent with
the freedom of speech.
In the case of Twitter bans, it likely would be more consistent with freedom
of speech for Twitter to remove any individual post that violates its terms
United States v. Frandsen, 212 F.3d 1231, 1236–37 (11th Cir. 2000).
Nebraska Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976).
19 Id. at 559.
20 Vincent Blasi, Toward a Theory of Prior Restraint: The Central Linkage, 66 Minn. L. Rev. 11,
49–54 (1981).
21 Near v. State of Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 735-36 (1931).
17
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of use, as opposed to banning an individual from all future expression on
the forum. Twitter’s stated reason for banning Trump was to reduce the risk
of incitement of violence.22 However, by permanently banning Trump from
Twitter outright, Twitter is not only censoring speech that could incite
violence, but also censoring all other speech, which could be entirely
innocent. This is not to say that Twitter should never permanently suspend
accounts. Twitter often suspends the accounts of ISIS operatives, QAnon
conspiracy theorists, and other individuals who consistently violate their
guidelines or pose a threat to public safety.23 Few people take issue with
this. However, permanently banning political actors, let alone a sitting
president, from ever accessing the forum again is a dangerous road to go
down and is a much more restrictive act of censorship than the principles
of free speech might prefer.
3. The First Amendment Can Limit the Rights of Private Entities
Again, the First Amendment states, “Congress shall make no law abridging
the freedom of speech.”24 However, the courts have made it entirely clear
that the First Amendment is not limited to acts of Congress, despite the
language of this clause. Rather, courts have extended the First Amendment
to many kinds of government action.25 Furthermore, the First Amendment
has even been applied to private entities in limited circumstances. Cases
like Marsh v. Alabama demonstrate that private property can function as a
public forum where people have free speech rights.26 In Marsh, Jehovah’s
witnesses were handing out literature on private property owned by the
Gulf Shipbuilding Company.27 The private property in question actually

See supra note 11.
See Twitter, Inc., An update on our efforts to combat violent extremism, TWITTER (Aug. 18,
2016), https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/a/2016/an-update-on-our-efforts-to-combat-violentextremism.html; Li Cohen, Twitter Unveils Plan to Limit QAnon Activity in New Crackdown,
CBS NEWS (JULY 22, 2020 / 4:23 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/qanon-conspiracytwitter-bans-accounts-crackdown/.
24 Supra note 5.
25 See Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 450 (1938) (holding that the First Amendment
applies to state and municipal governments); See also Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty.
Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969) (holding that the First Amendment can protect speech
in local public schools).
26 Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 502 (1946).
27 Id.
22
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looked and functioned like an ordinary town; but it was nevertheless
wholly owned by a corporation.28 The Court noted that, regardless of who
owns the town, there is an “identical interest in protecting free channels of
communication.”29 Furthermore, the Court stated, “Ownership does not
always mean absolute dominion. The more an owner, for his advantage,
opens up his property for use by the public in general, the more do his
rights become circumscribed by the statutory and constitutional rights of
those who use it.”30 Therefore, the Court held that because the private
property was free and accessible to the public, the private company could
not curtail the liberty of press, religion, and speech there.31
Marsh obviously deals with a very different context than Twitter. However,
the language above demonstrates that a private entity does not necessarily
have absolute power to restrict speech. Furthermore, the Supreme Court, in
Packingham v. North Carolina, recently said that the most important place for
the exchange of views in the modern world is “cyberspace—the ‘vast
democratic forums of the Internet’ in general . . . and social media in
particular.”32 The Court further stated that one of the most fundamental
principles of the First Amendment is that “all persons have access to places
where they can speak and listen, and then, after reflection, speak and listen
once more.”33 There, the majority opinion and the concurrence explicitly
stated that the Court has been, and should be, extremely cautious in
applying free speech principles to the internet because it is so vastly
different from the physical world.34 However, the way the court describes
social media demonstrates that the Court clearly views the internet as the
single most important forum for the exchange of ideas moving forward.
Therefore, although it is true that social media platforms have broad
discretion to censor content and ban users right now, that might not always
be the case. It is not difficult to imagine that Congress or the courts will play
a role in curbing the power of social media platforms over the course of the
coming years.

Id. at 502–03.
Id. at 507.
30 Id. at 506.
31 Marsh, 326 U.S. at 508–09.
32 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735 (2017).
33 Id.
34 Id. at 1736, 1744.
28
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Conclusion
Freedom of speech is one of the most highly regarded values in American
law. Free speech, especially on public issues, contributes to a diverse
marketplace of ideas in American society. Therefore, our society should
remain determined to protect free speech in all of its forms, even when it is
controversial. Most peoples’ opinions about the permanent suspension of
Donald Trump likely correlate directly to their politics. However, the idea
that a handful of social media companies can effectively cut off the most
direct channels of communication between a sitting president and millions
of constituents should scare people on both sides of the aisle. If we truly
care about the values underlying freedom of speech in America, then
perhaps our society should more seriously consider how we feel about
social media companies like Twitter possessing unilateral discretion to
control access to their platforms.
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